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HOMAYOUN MAFI*

Iran's Concession Agreements and the
Role of the National Iranian Oil
Company: Economic Development and
Sovereign Immunity
ABSTRACT
This article explores whether oil concession agreementsare private
contractsor public treaties. Specifically, to what extent is the stateowned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) bound by its
dealings with private companies? In addition, should sovereign
immunity apply to the action of a wholly state-owned corporation?
INTRODUCTION
The present article will first examine the concession agreement by
a cursory account of the history of concession in Iran and its most significant developments over time. This will pave the way for an evaluation of
the juridical character of an economic concession, which is still a source of
debate. Secondly, the article sets out the principal legal problem with which
this article is concerned, namely, whether the National Iranian Oil
Company is a State organ or a commercial corporation. Such a problem
carries a special significance in modern international trade, wherein state
or state-owned corporations are increasingly participating in commercial
relations with entities in the private sector.
With its own legal personality, a state-owned trading corporation
acting on a sovereign basis could claim state immunity. In this respect, if a
state-owned corporation is sued by a trading corporation in the courts of
another sovereign, it does not enjoy immunity and the plea of immunity
would not be successful. Whether the intention of the sovereign is to serve
private function activities determines if a public corporation is of private
law nature. As this article will show, the intention of the sovereign has to be
ascertained under the law governing the corporation and, in particular, its
constitution in light of all relevant circumstances. A test premised on the
nature rather than the purpose of the transaction is critical in determining
whether the transaction is governmental or commercial.

* Homayoun Mafi, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Mazandaran,
Babolsar, Iran.
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I. EVOLUTION OF CONCESSION AGREEMENTS
A. Traditional Concessions in Iran
Traditionally, the concession agreement1 was one of the main
instruments by which Iran gave some guarantees to foreign investors in its

1. For discussions of concession agreements, see the following literature: Laurence
Lockhart, Persian Petroleum in Ancient and Mediaeval Times, in IE CONGRtS MONDIAL DU
PETROLE, PARIS (1937); L.E. Frechtling, The Reuter Concession in Persia, 34 ASIATIC REV. 519
(1938); T. Guldberg, International Concessions, A Problem of InternationalEconomic Law, 15
NORDISK TIDSsKRFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 47 (1944); D.P. O'Connell, Legal Issues in the
Persian Oil Dispute, 26 NEW ZEALAND L.J. 57 (1952); Abolbashar Farmanfarma, The Oil
Agreement Between Iran and the InternationalOil Consortium:The Law Controlling,34 TExAS L.
REV. 259 (1955); Kenneth S. Carlston, The InternationalRole of ConcessionAgreements, 52 Nw.
U. L. REV. 618 (1957) [hereinafter Carlston, InternationalRole]; Kenneth S. Carlston, Concession
Agreements and Nationalization,52 AM. J.INT'L L. 260 (1958); Brudno, Review of Considerations
Arising in Foreign Oil Operations, in NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND
TAXATION 397 (1958); Leo T.Kissam & Edmond K. Leach, Sovereign Expropriation of Property
and Abrogation of Concession Contracts, FORDHAM L. REV. 28 (1959-1960); Maurice Bourquin,
Arbitrationand Economic DevelopmentAgreements,15 Bus. LAW. 860 (1960); J.N. Hyde, Economic
Development Agreements, 105 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 271 (1962); A. Verdross, QuasiInternationalAgreements and InternationalEconomic Transactions,in 18 Y.B. OF WORLD AFFAIRS
230 (1964); J.Gillis Wetter & Stephen M. Schwebel, Some Little-Known Cases on Concession, 40
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183 (1964); Raymond Vernon, Long-Run Trends in Concession Contracts,61
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 81 (1967); HENRY CATrAN, THE EVOLUTION OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (1967); Tom J. Farer, Economic Development Agreements:
A Functional Analysis, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 200 (1971); Pierre Barraz, The Legal Status
of Oil Concessions,5 J. WORLD TRADE 609 (1971); SHAVARSH TORIGUIAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF OIL
CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1972); ROBERT FABRIKANT, OIL DISCOVERY AND TECHNICAL
CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA - LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS IN THE
INDONESIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1973); DAVID N. SMITH & LouiS T. WELLS, JR., NEGOTIATING
THIRD-WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS: PROMISES AS PROLOGUE (1975); Thomas Walde, Lifting
the Veilfrom TransnationalMineralAgreements, 1 NAT. RESOURCES FORUM 227 (1977); S.A. Zorn,
New Developments in Third World Mining Agreements, 1 NAT. RESOURCES FORUM 239 (1977);
Erich Schanze et al., Mining Agreements in Developing Countries, 12 J. WORLD TRADE 135 (1978);

Thomas W. Walde, Revision of Transnational Investment Agreements: ContractualFlexibility in
Natural Resources Development,10 LAW. AMS. 265 (1978); Ashoka Varma, Note, Petroleum
Concessions in International Arbitration: Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab
Republic (Dupuy arb.) (PreliminaryAward, 1975; Award on the Merits, 1977), 18 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1979); Ian Brownlie, Legal Status of NaturalResources in InternationalLaw
(Some Aspects), 162 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 319 (1979); Samuel K.B. Asante, Restructuring
TransnationalMineral Agreements, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 335 (1979); Thomas W. Walde, Transnational Investment in the Natural Resources Industries, 11 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 691 (1979);
RUDIORO ROCHMAT, CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS IN OIL AND GAS MINING ENTERPRISES IN
INDONESIA (1981); Henry P. de Vries, The Enforcement of Economic Development Agreements with
Foreign States, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 1 (1984); J. Baloro, The Legal Status of Concession Agreements
in InternationalLaw, 19 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S.AFR. 410 (1986); M.A. Movahhed, Lessons from
PetroleumArbitrations, in 1 GOVERNING LAW (1996) (in Persian); N. FARSHADGOHAR; ASURVEY
ON IRAN'S OIL AGREEMENTS (2003) (in Persian).
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oil resources. A concession agreement, according to Professor A.A.
Fatouros, is "an instrument concluded between a state and a private person
and providing for the grant by the state to the individual of certain rights
or powers which normally would belong to and be expected by the state. "2
The first of the concessions dates back to 1901 when William D'Arcy, a
British citizen, obtained a concession from Muzzaffaraddin Shah to explore
oil in Iran. "The D'Arcy concession.. .was awarded by the corrupt and
inexperienced" Shah of the Qajar dynasty, who was dependent on foreign
support for his survival. 3 In 1909, a British company (the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, subsequently known as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and
later simply as British Petroleum) was formed to develop oil fields in the
south of Iran under a 60-year concession.4 The rationale behind the
formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was to ensure an
inexpensive and secure source of oil for the British navy by "expand[ing
Britain's] political dominance of [Iran] by bribery and force where
necessary."5 In 1914, the British Government took a controlling position in
the Company by buying 52.5 percent of the Anglo-Persian's voting power
of the outstanding stock. The result was a 40-year supply contract for the
sale of fuel oil to the British navy at special discount prices.6
In 1920 an agreement was concluded between the company and the
Persian Government with the objective of settling oil disputes arising over
the D'Arcy concession. The legal status of the 1920 agreement revealed that
it "was a modification and not an interpretation of the D'Arcy concession."
From the Iranian Government's point of view, the agreement was not
binding because it had not been approved by the Iranian Parliament.7 After
expressing concern about the amount of oil received, the Persian
Government cancelled Anglo-Persian's oil concession on November 28,

2.

A.A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 125 (1962).
3. See FEREIDUN FESHARAKI, DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ASPECTS 22 (1976).
4. Robert B. Stobaugh, The Evolution of IranianOil Policy, 1925-1975, in IRAN UNDER THE
PAHLAVIS 201, 202 (George Lenczowski ed., 1978).
5. Id. at 202; FESHARAKI, supra note 3, at 10.
6. W.M. Reisman, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice:
InternationalArbitration and InternationalAdjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (1996); Stobaugh, supranote 4,
at 202; FESHARAKI, supra note 3, at 8; DONALD N. WILBER, IRAN, PAST AND PRESENT 267 (1976).
In its preliminary observation in the Anglo-IranianOil Co. case, Iran noted that statements
made by members of the British Government in Parliament affirmed that the United Kingdom
owned a majority of the share of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and that this fact was
known to the Iranian Government. United Kingdom v. Iran, 19 INT'L L. REP. 501, 54142
(1952) (. Levi Carnciro, dissenting). See also Reisman, supra note 6, at 92.
7. Stobaugh, supra note 4, at 202.
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1932.8 The question may arise as to why the Persian Government cancelled
the concession. One reason was a purely economic dispute between Persia
and the company due to a decline in royalty payments. Another reason
could have been "the participation of the British Government in the
concession" and their interference in the commercial management of the
company. 9
On February 19, 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddegh
proposed to the Iranian Parliament that the oil industry be nationalized.
Subsequently, the Iranian Parliament nationalized Iranian oil in March
1951.10 The reasons why the Iranian Parliament decided to revise the
structure of the oil concession was Iran's recent independence, its desire to
earn higher oil revenues, the wish for more direct participation by the State,
and placing heavier financial burdens and greater risks on the companies."
In 1954, a consortium was formed of a group of international oil companies
to provide and market oil in an area of 100,000 squares miles in southern

8. Id. at 202-203.
9.

FESHARAKI, supra note 3, at 23.

10. The Official Gazette of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 12 Esfand 1330 [May 2, 1951]
(adopting The Law of Nationalization of Oil Industry on March 20, 1951). For the English
translation of the law, see M.W. Whileman, 8 DIGEsr OF INT'L L. 1074 (1967).
11. Europe Publications Ltd., THE MIDDLEEAST AND NORTH AFRICA 116 (42nd ed. 1996).
After the nationalization of the oil industry by the government of Mohammad Mosasddegh
in 1951, the British took the dispute to the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). Later, the
United Kingdom submitted a resolution to the United Nations' Security Council to require
Iran to conform to the provisional measures of the International Court of Justice. See S.H.
AMIN, COMMERCIAL LAW OF IRAN 104 (1986). Presenting Iran's position in regard to the
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Mohammad Mossaddegh and Allahyar
Saleh argued that
Iran's oil reserves could provide the most important means by which the
country would raise the low standard of living of its people. It should be a
national industry with the revenues going to improve the lives of Iranians.
Under the existing conditions before the nationalization, practically none of

the revenues went to improve the well-being of the people or the technical
process or industrial development of Iran. As long as the Company had a
monopoly on this great source of wealth, it was impossible for the Iranian

people to enjoy political independence. The Company had a budget larger
than that of the Iranian government. It intervened in the internal politics of
Iran and had a hand in elections and the formations of cabinets. All of this
was done in order to secure for itself the highest possible resources which it
controlled. Through its support of certain political groups and journalists,

it undermined the independence of the Iranian nation.
Peter D. Weinstein, The Attitude of the CapitalImporting Nations Towards the Taking of ForeignOwned Private Property, The Study of a New Force in International Law, in THIRD WORLD
ATrrUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 647,650 (Fredrick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai
eds., 1987).
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Iran. The preamble to the oil agreement of 1954 stated that its objective was
to assure
a substantial export market for Iranian oil as a means of
increasing the material benefits to and prosperity of the
Iranian people, and to the companies, on the other hand, the
degree of security and the prospect of reasonable rewards
necessary to justify the commitment of their resources and
facilities to the reactivation of the Iranian oil industry.... 12
The Consortium Agreement "gave to the Iranian the shadow of what they
sought, while retaining for the British the substance of what they had."13 In
1957, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was permitted to form
joint-venture agreements with the other companies. Later, in 1966, in
pursuit of Article 2 of the Petroleum Act of 1957,14 NIOC entered into
service contracts 5 under which foreign companies were working as a
contractor for NIOC but without having the ownership rights in the
country. 16 The emergence of joint ventures was due to the weakening of the
dominant position of the international majors and the formation of Oil
Producing Exporting Countries (OPEC), which assured the independent
companies of supplies of crude oil in the long term. 7 Part of the reason for
awarding the non-concessionary contract was also to maximize the short
term of oil revenues, since Iran could not expect spectacular increases in the
consortium revenues. 8 The role of the concession was ended in 1979 and

12.

E.I. NuwoGuGu, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNT-

RIES 169 (1965).
13. FESHARAKI, supra note 3, at 50 (quoting G.W. STOCKING, MIDDLE EAST OIL (1971)).
14. Article 2 holds that
[i]n execution of the provisions of this Act, the National Iranian Oil Company may negotiate with any person, whether Iranian or foreign, whose
technical or financial competence shall have been established, and may
conclude with such person any agreement which it deems appropriate, on
the basis of the terms and stipulations of this Act and other conditions not
inconsistent with the laws of the country.
1 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF SEA 309 (1973). See The Official Gazette of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, No. 3642.
15. In service contracts, "the investor provides the entire risk capital for exploration and
development which is reimbursed with interest, in cash or part of the oil produced, if the field
proves productive. This is a form of production sharing where the contractor is compensated
only upon discovery." Kameel I.F. Khan, Petroleum Taxation and Contractsin the Third World,
A Law and Policy Perspective, 22 J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1988, at 67, 84. Regarding service
contracts in Iran, see STOBAUGH, supra note 4, at 217-18; Asante, supra note 1, at 360-61;
FESHARAKI, supra note 3, at 78-82.
16. FESHARAKI, supranote 3, at 79.
17. Id. at 92.
18. Id. at 93.
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the ownership of the oil industry and the right to exploit petroleum deposits
throughout Iran was vested in the NIOC.
B. The Nature of an Oil Concession Contract
Up to the 1950s the concession was the traditional contractual
framework for the purpose of exploiting oil in Iran. The nature of economic
concession has long been a controversial issue in the area of international
law.1 9 According to Samuel K.B. Asante, ° the grant of concession does not
designate the concessionaire as the owner of a natural resource, but it
confers on the multinational corporation the exclusive right to exploitation
and marketing.
The question is whether oil concessions have the nature of public
law or fall within the province of private law.2' An oil concession has
neither exclusive public nor private character, but a mixed public and
private character. 22 Some scholars have suggested that the economic
development agreements have a public character because they involve vital
interests of the developing country. 23 It seems, therefore, that the State can
abrogate the concession by unilateral action in the public interest.24 It might
be argued that the matter is private because the concessionaire acquires
under the contract rights analogous to those in a contract of private law.2
Contracts concluded between a sovereign State and a foreign
national are not governed by international law but by the municipal law of
the sovereign State.26 The rationale is that the sovereignty cannot be
surrendered by a sovereign to an unequal foreign party. In the Serbian and

19.

See M. SORNARAJAH, THE PURSUIT OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY 79 (1986); IAN

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 547-51 (3rd ed. 1979). Brownlie

considered that there is no significant difference between a concession and other State
contracts. Brownlie, supra note 19, at 547. On the legal nature of petroleum agreements, see,
THE LEGAL CHARACrER OF PETROLEUM LICENSES, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Terence Daintith ed.,

1981).
20.
21.

Asante, supra note 1, at 362; Carlston, InternationalRole, supra note 1, at 627.
See A.Z. El Chiati, Protection of Investment in the Context of Petroleum Agreements, 204

HAGUE RECUEIL DES CouRS 36, 36 (1987).

22. Id. at 87; D.P. O'Connell, A Critiqueof the IranianOil Litigation,4 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
267, 270 (1955); Lord McNair, The General Principlesof Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1957).
23. Rainer Geiger, The UnilateralChangeof Economic Development Agreements, 23 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 73, 102 (1974); E.I. Nwogugu, Legal Problems of Foreign Investment, 153 HAGUE
RECUEIL DES COURS 211 (1976) (" [Elconomic development agreements contain the reciprocal
rights and duties which the parties thereto have agreed on to govern their relationship").
24. Derek William Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments On
Compensationfor Termination or Breach, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, at 55 (1988).
25. O'Connell, supra note 22, at 270.
26. See F.A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 178-79 (1973).
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Brazilian Loan cases,27 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
stated that "[a]ny contract which is not a contract between States in their
capacity as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of
some country. " '
Can an oil concession be termed an international treaty in nature or
an agreement similar to a treaty? This view lacks merit. A concession is not
analogous to a treaty29 since one of the parties is a foreign private company.
According to Derek William Bowett, an investment contract
not only is not a treaty but cannot even be regarded as
analogous to a treaty. For there is a world of differences
between an agreement under international law between two
equal, sovereign States and a contract between a State and a
private party governed prima facie by the State's own law.'
Economic concessions are not agreements between subjects of international law. According to Angelo Piero Sereni, 31 the rules of international
law do not lend themselves to the regulation of relations among parties
which are not recognized as international subjects. This view was accepted
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute
of 1952.32 On July 22, 1952, while declining its jurisdiction regarding the
Anglo-Iranian oil dispute,33 the Court authoritatively stated that the 1933
concession agreement
[i]s nothing more than a concession agreement between a
government and a foreign corporation. The United Kingdom
Government is not a party to the contract; there is no privity
of contract between the Government of Iran and the
Government of the United Kingdom. Under the contract the

27. Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France & Case
Concerning the Payment in Gold of the Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France, 1929 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) Nos. 20/21 (July 12), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serieA/A_20/62_
EmpruntsSerbesArret.pdf and http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_-A/A_20/64-Emprunts_
Bresiliens_Arret.pdf.
28. See Tang An, The Law Applicable to a TransnationalEconomic Development Contract, 21
J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1987, at 95, 97 (citing 2 WORLD COURT REPORTS, (Manley 0. Hudson
ed., at 352-53 (1935)).
29. See O'Connell, supra note 22; Nwogugu, supra note 23, at 217.
30. Bowett, supranote 24, at 54.
31. Angelo Piero Sereni, InternationalEconomic Institutionsand the MunicipalLaw of States,
96 HAGUE RECUEIL DES CouRs 210 (1959). Sereni argues that "an attempt at applying
international law to private relations would be tantamount to seeking to apply the
matrimonial laws of France or England to relations between cats or dogs." Id.
32. Greig argues that "it is possible for a State to enter into a contract with a corporation
or an individual, but such an agreement will not be a treaty cognizable as such on the
international Plane." D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 458 (1967).
33. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), 19 INT'L L. REP. 501, 521 (1952).
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Iranian Government cannot claim from the United Kingdom
any rights which it may claim from the Company, nor can it
be called upon to perform towards the United Kingdom
Government any obligations which it is bound to perform
towards the Company. The document bearing the signatures
of the Iranian Government and the Company has a single
purpose: the purpose of regulating the relations between the
Government and the company in regard to the concession. It
does not regulate in any way the relations between the two
Governments. 34
In Anglo-IranianOil Company v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha,35 the District
Court of Tokyo accepted the same view by holding that the Concession
Agreement of 1933 was not an international treaty in nature.36 It was in its
37
substance an agreement of a private law concerning the right to extract oil.
The Concession Agreement.. .cannot be regarded as an international treaty or an international convention of a nature
similar thereto, in view of the fact that one of the contracting
parties is not the Government of a State but is a foreign
corporation having its principal office in the United Kingdom.
The Concession Agreement should properly be regarded as
a contract under private law relating to oil extraction rights,
between the Government of a State and a foreign corporation. 3s

In the Aramco Arbitration (1958), the arbitration tribunal rejected the argument that the concession agreement could be analogized to an international
treaty. 39 Concessions are also referred to as economic development agreements stressing a fundamental description of economic rather than legal
nature.' Inthe SapphireArbitration(1967), 41 it was held that the "concessions

34.

Id. at 518-19; See alsoSUNIL KANTI GHOsH, THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL DISPUTE: A STUDY

OF PROBLEMS OF NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THEIR IMPACT ON

INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960).
35. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20 INT'L L. REP. 305
(1953).
36. Id. at 307-308, 310.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 312.
39. See An, supranote 28, at 97-98.
40. Geiger, supra note 23, at 74.
41. Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 INT'L L. REP. 136 (1967). The
agreement was signed on June 16,1958, between NIOC and Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd.,
a Canadian corporation calling for the establishment of an Iran-Canada oil company to be
known as IRCAN. See The Official Gazette of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1337, at 45-52.
Under the agreement the two parties formed a joint venture for the exploration and
exploitation of oil in the Iranian offshore areas and management of the operations. The net
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give the contract a particular character, which is partly public law and
partly private law."'
Some scholars have linked the economic concession to French
43
contrat administratif,
according to which the subject matter is concerned
with the recognition of the unilateral powers of the public authority to
control a conflict related to the public purpose. By reason of such public
interest, the State is given the power to amend unilaterally the concessions
or even to terminate them." According to Robert B. Von Mehren and P.
Nicholas Kourides, 45 administrative contracts have the following two
elements: (1) the ability of the public authority to alter unilaterally the terms
of the contract, and (2) the jurisdiction of a municipal administrative court
over disputes arising under the contract. According to F.A. Mann," even if
a concession is regarded as a contrat administratif,it is still under a specific
system of municipal law.
In the Texaco Arbitration,47 sole arbitrator Dupuy rejected the notion
that a concession agreement is an administrative contract under Libyan law.
The arbitrator said that the deeds of concession did not fulfill the necessary
conditions of administrative contracts." Contrary to the decision in Texaco,
in the British Petroleum Arbitration,49 the arbitrator, Judge Gunner K.
Lagergren, concluded that the concession agreement could be regarded as

profit was to be divided 25 percent for Sapphire and 75 percent for NIOC and Iran. See JeanFlavien Lalive, Contracts Between a State and a Foreign Company, Theory and Practice:Choice of
Law in a New Arbitration Case, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 987, 1002-1003 (1964).
42. Lalive, supra note 41, at 1012.
43. See WOLFGANG GASTON FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 200-06 (1964); On the French Contrat Administratif, see L. NEVILLE BROWN &J.F. GARNER
wITH THE ASSISTANCE OF NIcOLE QuEsIAux, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1973).
44. El Chiati, supra note 21, at 39.
45. Robert B. Von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, InternationalArbitrationBetween States
and Foreign Private Parties:The Libyan Nationalizations75 AM. J. INT'L L. 515 n.142 (1981).
46. MANN, supra note 26, at 265.
47. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab
Republic, 53 INT'L L. REP. 389 (1977). On the Texaco arbitration, see D.W. Bowet, Libyan
Nationalizationof American Oil CompaniesAssets, 37 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 5 (1978); A.A. Fatouros,
InternationalLaw and the InternationalizedContract,74 AM. J. INT'L L. 134 (1980). In the Texaco
award, Dupuy held that
[olne should take into account here the fact that the theory of administrative
contracts is somewhat typically French: it is consecrated by French law and
by certain legal systems which have been inspired by French law. But it is
unknown in many other legal systems which are as important as the French
systems and it has not been accepted by international law, notwithstanding
wishes which de legeferenda may have been expressed in this field.
Texaco, 53 INT'L L. REP., at 467.
48. Texaco, supranote 47, at 464.
49. B.P. Exploration Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic 53 INT'L L. REP. 297,
318-21 (1979).
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an administrative contract. In LIAMCO Arbitration,50 the arbitrator, Dr.
Sobhi Mahmassani, held that an oil concession is in fact a semi-public
agreement. Regardless of their "purpose," economic development
agreements are to be regarded by their "nature" as commercial activities.5'
II. THE ROLE AND POSITION OF THE NATIONAL
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (NIOC)
A. Is the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) a State Agency or a
Commercial Corporation?
In March 1951, subsequent to a proposal by Mohammad
Mossaddegh to the Iranian Parliament to nationalize the oil industry, the oil
committee of the Iranian Parliament voted in favor of nationalization of the
oil industry, which was under the control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company. Within the framework of the nationalization law (1951), the
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was established as the first national
oil company in the Middle East to develop Iran's industrial and commercial
hydrocarbon activities. As Robert Graham pointed out, it was "the only way
could assert its independence and maximise its potential oil
in which Iran
52
resources."
The Oil Nationalization Act of 1951 authorized NIOC to be engaged
in exploration, exploitation, and selling of Iranian crude. The Iranian Act on
Survey, Exploration, and Exploitation of the Oil Resources was approved
on July 31,1957. The most important feature of the Act was that it provided
a new basis for oil operations in the country. 3 The Act "was one of the first
well-thought-out and comprehensive petroleum laws of any oil-producing
country."' The main purpose of the Act was not only to protect the interests
of the country, but also to safeguard the national prosperity.55 Under the Act
the NIOC was recognized as the owner of Iran's oil resources. The

50.

American Oil Co. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 22 INT'L LEGAL

MATERIALS 1 (1981).

INT'L L.
51. Georges R. Delaume, Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity, 79 AM.J.
345 (1985).
52. ROBERT GRAHAM, IRAN: THE ILLUSION OF POWER 36 (1979). Kojanec has pointed out
that "whenever the State entrusts the exercise of an economic activity to the organs or
agencies, it is implicit that such an activity is regarded as being significant in the attainment
of political goals whose realization is to be achieved through special mechanisms of a broadly
public character." G. Kojanec, Recent Developments in the Law of State Contracts, in 24 THE Y.B.
OF WORLD AFFAIRS 186 (1970).
53. See Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Choice-of-Law Problems andInternationalOil Contracts:A
Case Study, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 503, 516 (1962).
54. FESHARAKI, supra note 3, at 66.
55. Id.
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Petroleum Act of July 31, 1957, has however, broadened its role and has
permitted it to form joint ventures with foreign companies. The reason was
to extend as readily as possible the operations of research, exploration, and
extraction of petroleum throughout the country and the continental shelf,
excluding the area of operations of the Consortium. It was also intended to
extend promptly the operations of refining, transportation, and sale of all
petroleum to be obtained from outside the Consortium throughout the
territory as well as abroad. 6 Thus, NIOC has its origins in the Nationalization of Oil Industry Law of Iran (1951) and the subsequent
law, namely,
57
the Law Regulating Nationalization of the Oil Industry.
Under the Iranian law, the proceeds from the sale of oil are
transferred by the NIOC to the Central Bank of Iran to be earmarked for
financing the Government budget." By exploiting the property rights of the
Iranian nation over reserves of oil and gas, and pursuing activities in related
industries, NIOC exercises the sovereign power of the Iranian nation over
Iran's oil deposits.5 9 The preamble of the 1973 Main Agreement, which
replaced the 1954 Consortium Agreement, provides that Iran has determined that the right of full and complete ownership, operation, and control
in respect to all hydro-carbon reserves and assets, and administration of the
petroleum industry shall be exercised by NIOC. 6 As far as conflict
resolution is concerned, it is a universal rule that the status of a company is

56. See art. 1 of the Act of July 31, 1957, on Survey, Exploration and Exploitation of the
Oil Resources in the Iranian Territory and Its Continental Shelf in The Official Gazette of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 3642. Pursuant to the Iranian Petroleum Act of 1974 "the exercise
of the right of the people of Iran, in respect to the Petroleum resources,...is exclusively
National Iranian Oil Company's responsibility." See Elf Aquitaine Iran v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co.
(Preliminary Award January 14, 1982), 69 INT'L L. REP. 252 (1994) (concluding that joint
venture agreements with foreign companies and opening Iran's resources for exploration were
in sharp contrast with the provisions of the law of Dec. 2,1944, which had banned any cabinet
minister from entering into negotiations for an oil concession and from granting it without
prior authorization from the Majles). However, despite this ban twelve 50-50 joint venture
contracts were concluded by NIOC between Oct. 29, 1957, and July 27, 1971. S.H. AMIN,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ISLAMIC AND IRANiAN LAW 250, 275 (1988). The following
reasons could be responsible for Iran's oil policy during the period under discussion: (1) The
stringent economic and political difficulties; (2) Iran's need of private foreign investment,
technological know-how and industrial skill; (3) Iran's willingness to participate actively in
oil operations through joint venture with foreign companies; and (4) protecting the legitimate
interests of the country vis-A-vis foreign companies. See Ramazani, supra note 53, at 517.
57. See Ramazani, supra note 53, at 506.
58. See Federal Republic of Germany: Federal Constitutional Court Decision Concerning the
National Iranian Oil Co., 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1279, 1282 (1983) [hereinafter Federal
Republic of Germany].
59. Id. at 1284.
60. See Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Iran, 69 INTL L. REP. 565, 570 (1985).
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determined by its personal law or the law of its incorporation.61 Therefore,
the constitution of a company is the ultimate source of authority for the
determination of its status. 62
But can it be argued that NIOC is part of the Iranian State? Under
the Consortium Agreement of 1954, NIOC has been described as "a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of Iran." 3 In regard to
NIOC, the functional approach sheds some light on its position. It is
established that NIOC is a company of both public and commercial
character. By way of example, NIOC Statutes' reveal the distinguishing
features of NIOC as a State corporation. Referring to the issue of sovereign
immunity in Sapphire,Jean-Flavien Lalive took the view that NIOC is not to
be equated to the State of Iran." The Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany in the National Iranian Oil Company Revenues from Oil Sales
Case also concluded that NIOC is not part of the Iranian State.' NIOC was
structured according to private law and carries out its business affairs
according to the principles of commercial law.67 Accordingly, NIOC is not
an international person but an instrument of the Iranian State responsible
for performing functions related to the production and sale of oil.' In Amoco
International Finance Corporation, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
concluded that "the separate personality of an entity controlled by a State
69
can be discarded.. .only if this entity acted as an instrument of the State."
The question is how much State control is necessary to render an
independent legal entity a part of the State. Pursuant to Article 23 of the
NIOC's statutes, its governing body, the High Council, is composed of four
Deputies of the Iran's House of Representatives, the Minister of Finance and
two other state officials. The Council of Ministers is empowered to

61. Francis A. Mann, InternationalCorporationsand NationalLaw,42 BRIT.Y.B. INT'LL. 145,
154-55 (1967).
62. Id. at 168.
63. See E.H. Wall, The Iranian-ItalianOil Agreement of 1957, 7 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 736, 741
"
(1958). Under Article 4 of the Public Accounting Law of Iran (1987), [a] government company
is a specific organization unit organized with the authorization of law or nationalized or
expropriated according to law or to the decree of a competent court which is known as a
government company and more than fifty percent of its shares belong to the government."
See AIDA AVANESSIAN, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL INACTION, 228 (1993).
64. The task of preparation of the Statutes of NIOC was entrusted to a mixed Board
composed of five members of the Senate, five parliamentarians, and the Minister of Finance.
See Ramazani, supra note 53, at 506-507.
65. Lalive, supra note 41, at 1007.
66. Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 58, at 1283.
67. Id.at 1283.
68. Id. at 1281-82.
69. ALLAHYAR MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE
WORK OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 194 (1994).
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nominate the seven members of the Board of Directors who represent the
shareholders in general meetings. ° Under Article 15, the Minister of
Finance and two other persons nominated by the Council of Ministers are
the representatives of shareholders in the general meeting. Meanwhile,
under Article 57 the Government is required to allocate the company's
income to the country's constructive and productive expenditure.
According to Professor Mahmoud Kashani, the Iranian judge at the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the degree of control should be
substantial and close to render the independent legal person a part of the
State.7 For a finding of control, the relevant questions are "inter alia,
whether the company was managed by its registered Board of Directors and
whether the shareholders were in a position to exert their rights and to
fulfill their duties as shareholders."72 To find that NIOC was an entity
controlled by the Iranian Government, in Oil Fieldof Texas the Tribunal held
that "(1) 'all NIOC's shares are, and have always been, owned by the
Government of Iran'; (2) that its business was and is supervised by the
Government of Iran; and (3) this process was conducted by the executive
branch of the State, at one time by the Prime Minister and six other Cabinet
Ministers, and subsequently by the Ministry of Petroleum. " 73 For the test of
control to be met, the award in Foremost Tehran, Inc. ruled that "[tlhe two
main indicators of government control of a corporation are the identity of
its shareholders and the compositions and behavior of its board of directors,
which must be examined together."74
When the question of control of an entity is to be decided, it would
seem reasonable to argue "that control does not necessarily require the
majority ownership of shares but may also be constituted through possessing the right or power to direct the policies and business of that entity."7 In
Mavromatis Palestine Concessions (1924), the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held that "control always means measures of a
special character in connection with an economic policy consisting in

70. See id. at 207.
71. Id. at 201.
72. Id. at 207.
73. Id. at 203.
74. Id. at 205 (citation omitted). Likewise, in Hollyfield, the Tribunal stated that
[diecisive elements for a finding of control are the identity of the company's shareholders,
the composition and behavior of its board of directors, and whether government appointed
managers were in charge of the company...." Id. at 206-207.
75. See AVANEssIAN, supranote 63, at 229.
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subordinating, in one way or another, private enterprise to public
authority."76
In practice, NIOC is Iran's most important State corporation, it
operates as a government agency, and its rights and obligations as indicated
in the relevant contracts have been consistently those of the Government of
Iran.' For example, in the Consortium Agreement of 1954, Sovereign Iran
was a Party by acting through the Imperial Government of Iran and the
National Iranian Oil Company. 78 Therefore, for all practical purposes, NIOC
has operated in the Consortium Agreement as a government agency on the
same footing as the government itself.79 This can further be seen in Article
47 of the 1957 Agreement between NIOC and AGIP [Azienda Generale
Italiana Petroli] Mineraria, which provides for the confirmation of the
Agreement by the Council of Ministers in the following manner: "This
Agreement, which has been signed by NIOC and AGIP Mineraria and
confirmed by the Council of Ministers shall have the force of8 law in
conformity with Article 2 of the Petroleum Law of July 31, 1957." 0
The role of the NIOC in the Iranian-Italian Agreement of 1957
seems to be as a State commercial corporation of public law. s' The
obligations and rights of NIOC may be equated with those of the Iranian
government. This could be illustrated for example by reference to Article 42,
which mentions expressly "the Iranian Government or First Party" and then
stipulates that under certain circumstances "the Iranian Government shall
have the right to require the impounding of the proceeds from oil sale or
export of petroleum from Iran by Second Party." 82Further evidence that this
is the true position can be found in Article 10, section 4(b) of the Iran-Pan
American contract, 83 which declares that prior consent of the Iranian

76. Case of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 20
(Aug. 30), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serieA/A_02/06Mavrommatis en_
PalestineArret.pdf.
77. See Ramazani, supra note 53, at 507.
78. See Wall, supra note 63, at 742.
79. Id.
80. Id. at n.12. art. 2 of the Petroleum Law requires all agreements of associations to be
submitted to the Council of Ministers, which, if it confirms the same, will place it before the
legislature for approval. Agreements, therefore, would be enforceable after approval by the
legislature and with effect from the date of such approval; the obligations of the Iranian
Government have also been mentioned in art. 28 of the Agreement with AGIP Mineraria
under which "the Iranian Government shall take the necessary steps to ensure that S.I.R.I.P.
[Societ6 Iranienne des Pstroles] and AGIP Mineraria shall be able to buy Iranian currency with
such foreign exchange as have been quoted by or are acceptable to the Bank Meli...." Id. at
n.13.
81. Id. at 742.
82. Ramazani, supra note 53, at 507-508.
83. Agreement between National Iranian Oil Co. and Pan American Petroleum Corp.,
April 24, 1958.
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Government for certain work under the contract "shall not be unreasonably
withheld or delayed."' In Sapphire,the arbitrator held that the dominant
status of NIOC is that of a public corporation.'
On the other hand, Article 65 of the statutes of NIOC makes it clear
that the company is a commercial corporation. By virtue of Article 10, "the
company's directors, the members of the High Financial Inspection Board,
and employees, shall in no respect be regarded as Government employees
or as persons entrusted with public services." Under Article 73, the
company is subjected to the provisions of the Iranian Commercial Code in
regard to all matters not stipulated in the NIOC statutes. In this sense,
NIOC is a government agency established in corporate form for the official
transaction of public business. s6
Since NIOC is a separate legal entity, its legal and commercial
independence is not affected by the fact that its shares are in the hands of
the Iranian Government. 7 This leads to the conclusion that government
instrumentalities, which are typically established as separate personalities
distinct and independent from their sovereign, should normally be treated
as such.'
B. Sovereign Immunity of State-Owned Corporations
One of the most important questions regarding the status of NIOC
is the question of sovereign immunity. 89 To what extent is NIOC bound by

84. Ramazani, supra note 53, at 507. The Iranian government undertook its obligation
"through the First Party," as mentioned in Section 1 of Article 17 of the Contract. Id.
85. Lalive, supra note 42, at 1012.
86. Ramazani, supra note 53, at 507.
87. See Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 58, at 1282.
88. See MANN, supra note 26, at 202.
89. See generally W.R. Bisschop, Immunity of States in Maritime Law, 3 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L.
159 (1922-23); J.W. Garner, Immunities of State-Owned Ships Employed in Commerce, 6 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 128 (1925); J.E.S. Fawcett, Legal Aspects of State Trading,25 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 34 (1948);
Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REv. 614
(1949-50); H. Lauterpacht, The Problemof JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220 (1951); Wm.W. Bishop, Jr., New U.S. Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM.
J. INT'L L. 93 (1953); SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); N.C.H. Dunbar, Controversial Aspects of Sovereign Immunity in
Some States, 132 HAGUE RECUEIL 197 (1971); European Convention on State Immunity, May
16,1972,11 INT'LLEGALMATERIALs470 (1972); Clive M. Schmitthoff & Frank Wooldridge, The
Nineteenth Century Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and the Importance of the Growth of State
Trading,2 DENVERJ. INT'L L. & POLICY 199 (1972); Monroe Leigh, Sovereign Immunity: The Case
of the Imias, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1974); Sompong Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States
before NationalAuthorities,149 RECUEIL DES COURS 87 (1976); P.J. Kincaid, Sovereign Immunity
of ForeignState-Owned Corporations,17J. WORLDTRADE 110 (1976); George Kahale, III & Matias
A. Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction:Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign
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its acts as an agent of the Iranian Government? There is by no means a
clear-cut answer to this question. The controversy pertains to the question
of sovereign immunity when a State or a wholly State-owned company
enters into contractual relationship with a foreign party and proceedings
are instituted by the latter against the former. Sovereign immunity,
according to M. Somarajah, 9° is a defense to jurisdiction that can be pleaded

States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1979-80); Sompong Sucharikul, Immunities of Foreign
States before National Authorities: Some Aspects of Progressive Development of Contemporary
InternationalLaw, 1 ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO INTERNATIONAL 477 (1979); Sompong Sucharitkul,
PreliminaryReport on JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property, (1979) 31 Y.B. INT'L
L. COM. 227, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/323; Gillian Triggs, Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: The State
as InternationalTrader,53 Ausm. L.J. 244 (1979); Sir lan Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity,
Recent Developments, 167 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 113 (1980); Seth Buchman, The Question
of Iran'sImmunity: Jurisdiction over a Foreign Sovereign, 7 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 41 (1981); George
Kahale, III, Arbitration and Choice-of-Law Clauses as Waivers of JurisdictionalImmunity, 14
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 29 (1981); James Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign
Sovereign Immunity, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 820 (1981) (hereinafter Crawford, ExecutionofJudgments);
United Nations Legislative Series, Materials on JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their
Property (1982) ST/LEG/Ser.B/20; James Crawford, InternationalLaw and Foreign Sovereigns:
DistinguishingImmune Transactions,54 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 74 (1983) (hereinafter Crawford,
InternationalLaw and Foreign Sovereigns); Christopher Osakwe, A Soviet Perspective on Foreign
Sovereign Immunity: Law and Practice, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 13 (1982-83); Inter-American Draft
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States, Jan. 21,1983,22 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS 292
(1983); GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW (1984);
CHARLESJAMEs LEWIS, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (1980); Spencer Weber Waller & Alan
M. Simon, Analyzing Claims of Sovereignty in InternationalEconomic Disputes, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 1 (1985-86); Hazel Fox, Sovereign Immunity and Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS ININTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 323 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1986); Peter D. Trooboff,
Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus of Principles,200 RECUEIL DES COUPS 235 (1986);
Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 26 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 625 (1987); Helmut Steinberger, State Immunity, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 428 (2000); SIR ROBERT JENNINGS, THE PLACE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
IMMUNITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW (1987); CHRISTOPHER H.
SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (1988); JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA,
SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS (1988); MICHAEL WALLACE GORDEN,
FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1991); Burkhard Heb, The
InternationalLaw Commission'sDraft Convention on the JurisdictionalImmunitiesof States and their
Property,4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 269 (1993); Ruth Donner, Some Recent Caselaw Concerning State
Immunity Before National Courts, 5 FINNISH Y.B. OF INT'L L. 388 (1994); Andreas Zimmermann,
Sovereign Immunity and Violations of InternationalJus Cogens: Some Critical Remarks, 16 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 16 (1994-95); Hazel Fox, Jurisdiction and Immunities, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 210 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996);
K.I. Vibhute, Waiver ofState Immunity by an Agreement to Arbitrateand InternationalCommercial
Arbitration,J. Bus. L. 550 (1998); ERNEST K. BANKAS, THE STATE IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRIVATE SUITS AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES IN DOMESTIC COURTS (2005);
Katherine Reece Thomas, State Immunity and Sovereign Debt Developments, 21 BUTTERWORTHS
J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 432 (2006).
90. SORNARAJAH, supra note 19, at 278-79.
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only by a State or an agency of the State. Clive M. Schmitthoft' argues that
under international trade law the plea of immunity from judicial process is
not raised automatically by State-controlled companies if case proceedings
are instituted against them in the courts of another sovereign.
There are some important factors that should be taken into consideration with regard to the sovereign immunity of foreign public corporations, including financial dependence, appointment of members, and the
degree of independence enjoyed by these corporations. 92 In order to claim
immunity for the person or property of a foreign sovereign, an important
test is ownership. 93 Thus, the mere ownership of the majority of shares and
capital of a separate company is a sufficient test for a finding of control by
the government.94 Meanwhile, regardless of the amount of government
ownership of its capital, a company will also be regarded a controlled company "when it performs functions of an essentially governmental nature."9"
Corporations established "by the State but possessing a distinct
legal personality" cannot plea immunity "from suit unless it can be proved
that the property which is the subject matter of the action is the property of
the State." 96 In other words, a State corporation having separate legal

91. Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Claim of Sovereign Immunity in the Law of InternationalTrade,
7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 452 (1958) (arguing that three theories regarding immunity have been
advocated: (1) The theory of absolute immunity under which "the plea of immunity is available in every instance in which the person or the property of a foreign sovereign is impleaded
in the courts of another sovereign"; (2) The theory of limited immunity according to which
a distinction is to be made between "acts of a sovereign jure imperii and acts juregestionis..."
advocates of this theory will admit the plea of immunity if acts of the former type are
involved - they argue "that the sovereign should not be exempt from legal process if engaged
in acts jure gestionis, such as commercial transactions"; (3) The theory of denial of immunity
by virtue of which a foreign sovereign is principally "not entitled to immunity from legal
process in the territory of another sovereign... subject to a number of important exceptions").
Id. at 453-54.
92. K.W. Wedderbum, Sovereign Immunity of ForeignPublic Corporations,6 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 296 n.4 (1957).
93. Schnitthoff, supra note 91, at 463 n.52.
94. MOURI, supra note 69, at 210.
95. AVANESSIAN, supra note 63, at 233. Under art. 4 of the Public Accounting Law of Iran,
"[a]ny Commercial company which is established by the investment of government
companies, as long as more than fifty percent of its shares are owned by government
companies, is itself considered to be a government company." Id. at 227.
96. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, A TREATIsE: PEACE 265, n.3 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
8th ed. 1955). According to Kojanec, "the corporation being a decentralised organ of the State,
with relative autonomy of decision, its activity may not be dissociated in so far as the application of international rules on State immunities are concerned." Kojanec, supranote 52, at 192.
In cases where the public corporation possessing a legal personality and capacity separate
from the State entered into contracts with a private investor, such contract directly involves
the State and impinges upon it the responsibility, as the State itself, from the perspective of
international law. Id.
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personality is not entitled to plea immunity unless the State concerned
in a certain transaction by exercising its sovereign rights stricto
intervened
97
senso.

The intention of the foreign sovereign is another decisive factor
with regard to making its agent a commercial concern on the level of private
law.9" In other words, whether the trading corporation is of an ordinary
private law nature reflects the intention of the sovereign to act on the level
of private law. 9 If that is the case, the corporation cannot claim the plea of
immunity. Such intention is to be ascertained in accordance with the
governing law of the corporation by reference to the constitution of the
corporation and, in particular, its power to contract."° Where it has been
established that a typical government instrumentality is not a trading
corporation of ordinary private law nature, the question of whether the
corporation is entitled to immunity will be dependent on the same criteria
that applies when the sovereign has been directly impleaded.' °
Following the Sapphire Arbitration and in the enforcement
proceedings Sapphire assigned its rights against NIOC to a Dutch company
under the name of N.V. Cabolent. 1' 2 The rationale for the Sapphire corporation was to take "advantage of a Dutch exorbitant rule of jurisdiction"
(Article 126 (3) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure) "based on the
" Subsequently, N.V. Cabolent
plaintiff's domicile in the Netherlands. " °3
brought suit at The Hague for the amount of the award and for a
declaratory judgement validating the attachment of certain Dutch assets of
NOC.l NIOC's plea of immunity, although successful in the first instance,
later failed in the Court of Appeal. While considering matters such as the

97. Leo J. Bouchez, The Nature and Scope of State Immunity from Jurisdictionand Execution,
10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 33 (1979).
98. Schmitthoff, supra note 91, at 466. The intention of the sovereign may be ascertained
according to the law governing the corporation and its powers to contract. Id. at 466-67; see
also Wedderbum, supra note 92, at 297.
99. Schmitthoff, supranote 91, at 466.
100. Id. at 466-67.
101. Id. at 467.
102. Delaume, supranote 51, at 322.
103. Georges R. Delaume, Enforcement of State ContractAwards: JurisdictionalPitfalls and
Remedies, 8 ICSID REv. -FOREIGN INvESTMENT L.J. 29, 31 (1993) [hereinafter Delaume,
Enforcement of State Contract Awards]. In the pleadings before the Court, the question was
raised on behalf of NIOC as to whether the appellant (N.V. Cabolent) had a valid existence.
It was argued, inter alia, that Cabolent, as a tool of the Sapphire corporation, was formed in
order to create jurisdiction in the Netherlands under the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.
Although the Dutch court was aware of the stratagem, it stated that this purpose was not
illicit, nor was it incompatible with the purpose of profit making. Id.
104. N.V. Cabolentv. National Iranian Oil Company, 9 INT'LLEGALMATERIALS 152 (Court
of Appeal, The Hague 1968). For the Dutch version, see Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (1969),
No. 484.
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ownership and control of NIOC by the Iranian Government, the Court of
Appeal maintained that NIOC had a separate juridical existence and that
its assets were distinguishable from those of the Iranian government. In this
connection, the court stated that NIOC's operations as a separate entity and
as a party to the contract with Sapphire would not be considered as actajure
imperii (sovereign acts) and should instead be characterized as commercial
acts, jure gestionis (acts of a private-law nature).'
All other matters.. .concerning the structure and authorities of
NIOC, its ties with the State of Iran and the significance of
petroleum for that country are irrelevant. The fact that the
Iranian oil industry was nationalized by Law of March 15 and
20, 1951; that N.I.O.C. was established by Law of April 30,
1951; that all its shares are owned by the Iranian State and
cannot be transferred; that the Government of Iran can
influence N.I.O.C.'s management; that N.I.O.C. has certain
powers of a public law nature, including the power to
expropriate land against compensation-all these and similar
facts do not detract from.. .the conclusion [that NIOC could
not plead immunity]."
The crucial question is whether the principle of international law providing
that States are bound by arbitral clauses in their international agreements
also applies to agreements made, not by the State itself, but by a corporation
established as an independent legal entity but controlled by the State.1 7 It
may be plausible to argue that since the links between the Iranian
government and the board directing NIOC are close, any agreement with
a private oil company for the exploitation of oil in Iran concluded by NIOC
cannot be treated differently from an agreement signed by the State itself
as a party in regard to the obligation under international law to respect
contracts on arbitration °8
C. The Distinction Between the Public and the Private Nature of the
Transaction
The states in the course of the nineteenth century and later after
World War I increased their activities abroad through public corporations
and have evolved in business operations on a considerable scale. In this

105.
106.

Delaume, supra note 51, at 322.
Id. (quoting N.V. Cabolent v. National Iranian Oil Company, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 160 (Court of Appeal, The Hague 1968)).
107. See Elf Aquitaine Iran v. National Iranian Oil Company, 96 INTL L. REPORTS 252, 275
(1982) (Preliminary Award).

108. Id.
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regard and as far as the immunity from jurisdiction is concerned, the
doctrine of restrictive immunity has increasingly gained ground in
international relations. In applying the principle of restrictive immunity,
reference is often made to the distinction between acts jure imperriand acts
jure gestionis. This means that where a foreign State or a foreign State
corporation acts on a sovereign basis, the plea of immunity is available, but
non-sovereign activity does not enjoy freedom from jurisdiction. The
practice of states seems also to support a trend toward the adoption of a
restrictive doctrine of immunity. 1°9
In cases where a dispute involves a transaction of both commercial
and governmental elements, the question could arise as to which test is to
be applied to determine the ultimate object of the transaction. The decisive
criteria is premised either on purpose or nature. Under recent developments
of international law, the acts of a foreign State that are considered
commercial in nature do not enjoy sovereign immunity. The underlying
rationale is that when a state is involved in business in competition with
private persons, competition would be unfair if the competing state is not
answerable in the foreign court where the business is transacted.10
Therefore, in situations where a State entity engages in commercial
activities, it would be fair to conclude that the State would accept that its
obligations, as identified by a foreign court, should be fulfilled."' It has in
fact been suggested, "[tihat a State which seeks to trade through public
corporations should not be allowed to plead immunity and thereby avoid
the commercial obligations it has undertaken."" 2 The commerciality of an
act is to be determined by reference to the nature of the act rather than by
reference to its purpose." 3 The reference to the "nature" of the action means
nothing other than excluding the domestic law of the defendant State and
applying lexfori to the case. On the contrary, the focus on the "purpose"
does necessitate taking account of the domestic law of the defendant
State."' On the other hand, while the criterion based on purpose probes into

109. See, e.g., The European Convention on State Immunity, Basle, 16.V.1972; United States
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 97 (2000); The United Kingdom State
Immunity Act of 1978,17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1123 (1978); The Canadian State Immunity
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18; and the Australian Foreign States Immunity Act, Act No. 196 of 1985.
110. Bouchez, supra note 97, at 8.
111. M. Sornarajah, Problems in Applying the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 31
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 661, 665 (1982).
112. Id. at 663.
113. Crawford, International Law and Foreign Sovereigns, supranote 89, at 93 (citing U.S.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 1603(d) (2000)).
114. Heb, supra note 89, at 273.
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motive of the act, a test based on nature insists for ascertainment of juridical
character of the State activity and the capacity in which the act was done.1 '
Almost every activity would ultimately be regarded as having a
public-purpose nature if the purpose test's basic criterion was to demonstrate the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign activity. Under
the United States' Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "it is the essentially
commercial nature of an activity or transaction that is critical" in determining whether the relevant transaction is commercial or governmental." 6 The
European Convention on State Immunity also adopted a restrictive
approach to immunity. Instead of a conclusive definition for commercial
transaction, it seeks to categorize a list of typical activities of foreign
sovereigns to which immunity is not allowed to invoke (articles 1 through
14). Article 7 of the Convention provides,
[A] Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the
jurisdiction of a court of another Contracting State if it has on
the territory of the State of the forum an office, agency, or
other establishment through which it engages, in the same
manner as a private person, in an industrial, commercial, or
financial activity, and the proceedings relate to that activity
of the office, agency, or establishment.
The Convention actually provides a basis for distinguishing
immune from non-immune state activity. Taking into account the specific
rules for each category, the question is whether a particular act falls under
one of the examples or beyond it. This is a question that is to be decided by
the court before which the point arises.
The English courts have also held that the restrictive principle of
immunity applies at common law. The matter has been settled by the State
Immunity Act of 1978, which shows a trend toward the restrictive doctrine
of immunity. 117The English courts, when applying the nature test, primarily
take into account whether the act was one that could also be done by a
private corporation or whether it could only be done by a sovereign state
in the exercise of its sovereign power."8

115. K.I. Vibhute, Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Trading Enterprises in India: An
Appraisal, J. Bus. L. 628, 631 (1994).
116. Sornarajah, supra note 111, at 669 (citation omitted).
117. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLESOF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (1990). 11 ILM (International Legal Materials) 470 (1972).
118. Dons Hockl, The State Immunity Act of 1978 and its Interpretationby the English Courts,
48 AusrRIAN J. PuB. &INT'LL. 134 (1995). Although there is no consensus in international law
regarding the distinction between private acts of states and their public acts, it can be said that
only property protected by diplomatic and consular immunity, warships, and military aircraft
used for public purposes are out of the jurisdiction of a forum state. This restriction is
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The restrictive practice that confines the jurisdictional immunity of
foreign States reveals an inclination to pay more attention to the nature, or
object, of the transaction than to the status of the defendant. This would
mean that the immunity ratione personaeis losing ground to the immunity
ratione materiae."9
In some cases, the commercial nature of the corporation has made
the government a partner in a trading corporation so far as the transactions
of that corporation are concerned.12 ° In National Iranian Oil Company
Pipelines Contracts'2' regarding a dispute over the financial performance of
contracts to build up oil and natural gas pipelines, the plaintiff obtained an
order from the Provincial Court (Landgericht) of Frankfurt am Main
attaching property of the NIOC (defendant). The NIOC unsuccessfully
argued that it formed part of the Iranian Government and thus was entitled
to jurisdictional immunity as well as immunity from attachment.' 22The plea
of immunity was rejected by the Court
for the simple reason that the present case does not involve
the actual exploitation of oil resources by the defendant in the
attachment proceedings. The parties are in dispute over the
financial performance of contracts for the building of oil and
gas pipelines. In this respect, moreover, the defendant
contracted with the plaintiff on a purely private commercial
basis (contracts for work). It did not carry out any oil-related
activities on a sovereign basis. The conclusion of the contracts
for oil and gas pipelines was at most a preliminary step or a
sequel to possible sovereign activity."23
Likewise, in National Iranian Oil Company Legal," 4 the Superior Provincial
Court (Oberlandesgricht) of Frankfurt au Main maintained that immunity
can not be claimed for the funds from oil agreements deriving from
commercial activity.' 25
In Eurodifv. Iran,"6 the main issue was whether the activities of
production and distribution of nuclear energy in which the Iranian

generally recognized and established in international law. See Crawford, Execution of
Judgments, supra note 89, at 820; Bouchez, supranote 97, at 15.
119. H.F. van Panhuys, In the BorderlandBetween the Act of State Doctrine and Questionsof
JurisdictionalImmunities, 13 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1193, 1210 (1964).
120. Wedderburn, supra note 92, at 294.
121. 65 INT'L L. REP. 212 (1984).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 214.
124. 65 INT'L L. REP. 199 (1984).
125. Id. at 202; see also Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 58, at 1285.
126. Jan Paulsson, Sovereign Immunity from Jurisdiction:French Caselaw Revisited, 19 INT'L
LAW 277, 283 (1985) (citing 1984 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (May 23) 20205).
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Government had undertaken to participate were of a commercial nature
that subjects them to private law. The Cour de Cassation while revising the
decision of the Court of Appeal of Paris to accord immunity to the Iranian
government on the sole basis that the attached assets were public funds,
held that a foreign State in principle benefits from immunity of execution,
but this immunity may be ruled out where the seized asset has been
allocated to economic or commercial activity governed by private law.
The foregoing observations taken together justify this widely
accepted view within the international community that the restrictive
immunity rule predicates on a distinction between commercial and noncommercial acts of States.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has shown that there is uncertainty and confusion as to
the exact nature and legal status of oil concessions. However, economic
concessions are not treaties since they are not concluded between states.
NIOC is a company established under the Iranian law of 1951 as a separate
legal entity with special capitalization in the form of a joint-stock company,
but controlled by the Iranian Government. A contract entered into by NIOC
with a foreign oil company is treated as a contract signed by the Government of Iran itself. In fact, commercial undertakings of a foreign State do
not enjoy any personal immunity. From a commercial point of view, NIOC
is closely linked with the Iranian Government and exercises the principle of
ownership and national sovereignty of Iran on the oil and gas resources and
reservoirs of the country in accordance with Article 45 of the Iranian
Constitution. 127 Under international law, it is submitted, the plea of

127.

The text of art. 45 reads as follows:
Natural resources and national wealth such as waste lands or deserted
lands, mines, seas, lakes, reed beds, natural woods, virgin land and pastures
are part of the public domain. Heirless property and property of unknown
ownership and public property restored from usurpers are in the possession
of the Islamic government which will determine the best way to utilize them
in the interests of the nation. Details and manner of usage will be determined by law.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1358 [1980], art. 45. English translation
availableathttp://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution -chO4.php. Iran's
national resources are public property (or Anfal). Id. The designation of petroleum resources
as public property demonstrates a change of terminology to Islamize the system. The Iranian
Law does not recognize private rights to oil resources. Therefore, all the operations relating
to petroleum are under the Islamic Republic's control and are subject to strict statutory
provisions. See Petroleum Act of 09-7-1366 [May 30, 1947] (Iran), The Official Gazette of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 12444, 25-08-1366 [July 14, 1947], reprinted in Moini-Biontino
Verlagsgesellshchaft, IRAN Y.B., 1988, 398-402. See also AMIN, supra note 56, at 258-59.
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immunity is not raised automatically. The question whether a particular
trading corporation acts within or beyond its capacity is to be determined
by interpreting the constitution of the corporation, its financial dependence
and the degree of dependence on the state, and all other relevant circumstances.
Due to the lack of financial resources and technological knowledge,
the developing countries are in a very weak bargaining position in dealing
with multinational oil companies. Perhaps the key to the solution of stability
problems is a more flexible mechanism capable of compromising between
the stability of contracts and their evolution, between the principle pacta
sunt servanda and the clause rebes sic stantibus.'2
By the device of an inbuilt mechanism for systematic renegotiations,
a long-term oil contract can provide a basis for a viable and enduring
contractual relation between a host State and a multinational oil company
if it is considered "as the broad framework of a business relationship which
admits of a continuous process of accommodation and adjustment between
the parties, rather than a body of fixed rights and obligations impervious to
political, economic and social changes."' 29

128. El Chiati, supra note 21, at 112.
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